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The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may no 
longer be best suited for its new environment. Building upon prior, multidisciplinary 
research, we draw upon the best knowledge and practice in change management, 
and analyze transformation from the classic Hierarchy to the Edge-like Holonistic 
organization, which offers excellent potential for performance improvement. Such 
analysis focuses on the processes of change from one organizational form to 
another and leads to the generation of transformational plans, which can be used by 
acquisition leaders, practitioners and policy makers to outline steps—and leaps—
required to affect fundamental organizational change. We also build upon prior work 
on computational modeling and experimentation to develop models of the 
transformation process, and we explore such models to emulate the behavior of the 
alternate transformational plans noted above. By modeling and experimenting with 
processes of change, as opposed to processes of ongoing organizational routines, 
we begin to extend the state-of–the-art in computational modeling and 
experimentation. Practically, answers to our research questions have direct and 
immediate application to acquisition leaders and policy makers. Theoretically, we 
generalize to broad classes of organizational transformations and prescribe a novel 
set of organizational redesign guides.  
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 Executive Summary 
The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may no 
longer be best suited for its new environment. Building upon prior, multidisciplinary 
research, we draw upon the best knowledge and practice in change management, 
and analyze transformation from the classic Hierarchy to the Edge-like Holonistic 
organization, which offers excellent potential for performance improvement. Such 
analysis focuses on the processes of change from one organizational form to 
another, and leads to the generation of transformational plans, which can be used by 
acquisition leaders, practitioners and policy makers to outline steps—and leaps—
required to effect fundamental organizational change. We also build upon prior work 
on computational modeling and experimentation to develop models of the 
transformation process, and we explore such models to emulate the behavior of the 
alternate transformational plans noted above. By modeling and experimenting with 
processes of change, as opposed to processes of ongoing organizational routines, 
we begin to extend the state of the art in computational modeling and 
experimentation. Practically, answers to our research questions have direct and 
immediate application to acquisition leaders and policy makers. Theoretically, we 
generalize to broad classes of organizational transformations, and prescribe a novel 
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 Introduction 
Acquisition is big business. Drawing from Dillard and Nissen (2005) in this 
section, we note that the US Department of Defense (DoD) alone executes routinely 
eleven-figure budgets for research, development, procurement and support of 
weapon systems, for instance. Acquisition is also a rule-intensive business. In 
addition to myriad laws governing federal acquisition in the US, a plethora of 
regulations specify—in great detail often—how to accomplish the planning, review, 
execution and oversight of Government acquisition programs, large and small, sole-
source and competitive, military and commercial (Dillard, 2003). Due in great part to 
the large size and many rules associated with Defense acquisition in particular, the 
organizations responsible for DoD acquisition activities tend to be large and rule-
intensive themselves, reflecting the kinds of centralized, formalized, specialized and 
oversight-intensive forms corresponding to the classic Machine Bureaucracy from 
Organization Theory (e.g., see Mintzberg, 1979). Bureaucratic organizations are 
known well to excel in terms of efficiency when situated in stable, predictable 
environmental contexts, but this classic organizational structure is also known well to 
be exceptionally poor at anticipating and responding to change. In the context of 
military transformation, the associated problem should be clear and compelling: the 
Defense acquisition environment today is neither stable nor predictable.  
Prior Research to Investigate this Problem 
Prior research to investigate this problem (Dillard & Nissen, 2005) examined 
the Hierarchy with respect to two alternate organizational forms: Decentralized and 
Holonistic, which were identified theoretically to offer potential to improve the 
performance of Defense acquisition organizations. This empirical examination was 
conducted in two contrasting environments contexts: Routine and Stressful, which 
characterize the acquisition environments of yesterday and today, respectively. 
Using computational models of the Hierarchy and two alternate organizational forms, 
across the two contrasting environmental contexts, a 3x2 factorial experiment was 
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 conducted to assess the relative performance of each organizational form and 
environmental context combination. 
Table 1.  Prior Experimental Results (adapted from Dillard & Nissen, 2005) 
 
Table 1 summarizes the prior experimental results for reference. The table 
includes measures for project duration, cost, risk, and other key dependent variables 
that provide insight into comparative organizational performance. The six columns 
represent each cell of the 3x2 factorial experiment. The first three cells summarize 
performance of the Hierarchy (labeled “Typical Organization”), Decentralized and 
Holonistic organizational forms in a Routine environmental context. Notice that both 
of the alternate organizational forms reflects shorter project schedules (i.e., 
measured by duration; 428 and 407 days for the Decentralized and Holonistic, 
respectively, vs. 556 for the Hierarchy) and lower project costs (i.e., measured in $K; 
$4674 and $4565 for the Decentralized and Holonistic, respectively, vs. $8085 for 
the Hierarchy) than the Hierarchy does. Alternatively, both alternate organizational 
forms reflect higher project risk (i.e., measured in terms of project exceptions that 
were either not reworked or not reworked completely (lower is better); 0.54 and 0.76 
for the Decentralized and Holonistic, respectively, vs. 0.41 for the Hierarchy) than 
the Hierarchy does. Hence, one can observe a seemingly fundamental tension 
between project speed and cost versus risk (see Nissen & Buettner, 2004), a tension 
that requires either explicit or implicit tradeoffs to be made by leaders and policy 
makers interested in the performance of acquisition organizations. 
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 The next three cells summarize performance of these same three 
organizational forms in a Stressful environmental context. Notice first that, in terms 
of project duration and cost, all three organizational forms perform worse under 
environmental stress than they do in a routine environment, but that project risk does 
not change appreciably between the two contrasting environmental contexts. Hence, 
all three organizational forms appear to be quite sensitive to stress in terms of 
schedule and cost, but appear also to be relatively robust to stress in terms of risk. 
One can see how this prior research is elucidating the relative, contingent 
characteristics of alternate acquisition organizational forms and environmental 
contexts. 
Notice second that, as above in the routine environmental context, both of the 
alternate organizational forms reflects lower project costs ($6708 and $4973 vs. 
$8561) and higher project risk (0.55 and 0.76 vs. 0.37) than the Hierarchy does. 
However, in contrast with the former results, schedule performance by the 
Decentralized organization is worse than that of the Hierarchy (604 vs. 580 days); 
yet, the Holonistic organization maintains relatively good schedule performance (458 
days). Not only does the Holonistic organization outperform its Hierarchy and 
Decentralized counterparts in terms of project duration and cost, this form appears 
to be the most robust to environmental stress, as the effect of such stress on its 
relative performance is much smaller than on the relative performance of the other 
two organizational forms.  
To summarize, the seemingly fundamental tension between project speed 
and cost-versus-risk persists across contrasting environmental contexts, and 
necessitates either explicit or implicit tradeoffs to be made by leaders and policy 
makers interested in the performance of acquisition organizations. Plus, the three 
organizational forms react differently to environmental stress, which necessitates 
another set of tradeoffs to be made—explicitly or implicitly. As such, acquisition 
leaders and policy makers have new knowledge about contingent relationships 
between alternate organizational forms and their relative performance across 
contrasting environmental contexts. Such knowledge enables a new—or at least 
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 previously unrecognized or ignored—capability to design, or more appropriately to 
redesign, organizations to perform better in the changing acquisition environment of 
today and tomorrow.  
Moreover, because such leaders and policy makers retain considerable 
control over organizational designs, the associated transformation from one 
organizational form (esp. the Hierarchy) to another (e.g., Decentralized or Holonistic) 
can be affected largely without reliance upon new regulations or legislation. In 
combination with acquisition reforms that have been ongoing for a decade or more, 
this provides seemingly unprecedented power to acquisition leaders and policy 
makers to improve the performance of the organizations in their charge. 
Notwithstanding such new knowledge, capability and power, however, knowing what 
organizational design is most likely to perform best in a given environmental context 
does not imply that knowing how to accomplish the required redesign will follow. 
Indeed, the question, how to change major acquisition organizations to adopt the 
best loci of knowledge, responsibilities and decision rights, is more difficult than—yet 
follows directly from—the question above concerning which organizational form to 
select. This latter “knowing how” question is addressed through research described 
in the present article. 
Present Research to Address Organizational Redesign 
Building upon the prior research summarized above, we draw upon the best 
knowledge and practice in change management (e.g., including models of planned 
change, change typologies, large-scale change, and sense-making) to analyze 
transformation from the classic Hierarchy to the two organizational forms 
(Decentralized and Holonistic) in the acquisition domain. As suggested above, such 
analysis focuses on the processes of change from one organizational form to 
another and leads to the generation of transformational plans—involving both radical 
and incremental means—which can be used by acquisition leaders, practitioners 
and policy makers to outline steps—and leaps—required to affect fundamental 
organizational change.  
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 We also build upon prior work on computational modeling and 
experimentation to develop a preliminary model of the transformation process. With 
further model development, exploration and refinement, we hope to utilize such a 
model to emulate the behavior of the alternate transformational plans noted above. 
By modeling and experimenting with processes of change, as opposed to processes 
of ongoing organizational routines, we can extend the state-of-the-art in 
computational modeling and experimentation. Practically, answers to our research 
questions have direct and immediate application to acquisition leaders and policy 
makers. Theoretically, we generalize to broad classes of organizational 
transformations and prescribe a novel set of organizational redesign guides. 
With this research agenda expressed, the balance of the article begins with 
description of the three-part research design. We then articulate the qualitative 
research findings, and follow with relatively in-depth discussion of planned change. 
A preliminary, computational model of one change process follows in turn. The 
article closes with key conclusions, implications for practice, and topics for future 
research to continue building upon this investigation. 
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 Research Design 
This discussion of the research design is organized into three parts: 1) 
qualitative inquiry, 2) theoretical analysis, and 3) computational experimentation. 
This integration of three, distinct research methods enables a degree of empirical 
grounding, theoretical synthesis, experimental control and triangulation that would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve otherwise. Each part is discussed in turn. 
Qualitative Inquiry 
We undertake a qualitative research study to investigate the deep meaning 
associated with managing acquisition organizations, and to draw directly upon the 
experiences of veteran acquisition managers. The major portion of this study is 
conducted by a team of PhD students working under supervision of the authors. We 
acknowledge their helpful contribution here. The emphasis of this qualitative 
fieldwork is upon project managers, who offer insight into conditions that signal 
organizational change, and into reactions to such conditions. Grounded theory 
building along the lines of Glaser and Strauss (1967) provides the key 
methodological guide for the study, with heavy utilization of interviews guided in 
large part by Rubin and Rubin (1995). The two, interrelated research questions 
addressed through this fieldwork are: 1) how does the acquisition manager know 
when change is needed? and 2) what are the enablers and obstacles to create 
successful organizational change? Clearly such fieldwork supports the overall focus 
of the research described in this article, and such qualitative analysis complements 
well the other methods employed. 
This summary of the qualitative research method draws heavily from and 
synthesizes the ideas of Bourazanis (2005), Bush (2005), Gateau (2005) and Mirano 
(2005). The students interviewed four experts in the field of acquisition. All four had 
acquired significant program management and acquisition experience, as well as 
operational military experience. All were retired, senior, US military officers, including 
two Army Colonels, an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and a Navy Commander. This 
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 provides a basis for comparison across three US Military services, yet focuses on 
experienced, senior professionals. Their status as retired military officers introduces 
a somewhat rarefied perspective into the study, as their first-hand acquisition 
experiences took place several years in the past. However, each informant indicated 
vivid recall of the past events, and confirmed ongoing understanding of events and 
changes in the acquisition field since retirement. Indeed, all four informants serve 
currently as acquisition faculty members whose primary professional purpose 
involves staying current in the acquisition field.  
The four interviewers worked collaboratively to develop a common, semi-
structured protocol with ample opportunities for probing, snowballing and follow-up. 
Each interview lasted roughly sixty minutes and was recorded and transcribed. Each 
of the four students transcribed, coded and analyzed one of the four interviews 
independently, but the four interview transcripts were pooled for use by all four 
students. Hence, each student had access to, and conducted his analysis across, all 
four interview transcripts; yet, each student produced his own, independent paper 
from these qualitative data. The authors of this present article also read through the 
four interview transcripts, as well as the student papers, and developed their own, 
synthesized interpretation by treating the student syntheses as secondary data. 
Theoretical Analysis 
Theoretical analysis represents the centerpiece of this article as we draw from 
the change literature—broadly defined—to address the “how to change” question 
posed above. This theoretical analysis is framed to complement the qualitative 
results, and focused to help guide computational model development. As such, it 
represents a metaphorical fulcrum, which leverages qualitative research on one side 
against computational experimentation on the other. Mixing metaphors, we sandwich 
theoretical analysis between two empirical studies: qualitative results that have been 
analyzed and computational experimentation yet to be accomplished. 
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 Computational Experimentation 
We undertake a study based upon computational experimentation, which 
builds directly upon prior work along such lines by Nissen and Levitt (2004) and 
Dillard and Nissen (2005). As highlighted first by Nissen and Buettner (2004), 
computational experimentation bridges the chasm between analytical and laboratory 
methods on the one side—which are powerful in terms of control, but suffer from 
problems with external validity and generalizability—and field methods on the other 
side—which are powerful in terms of realism, but suffer from problems with internal 
validity and reliability. Particularly when integrated with other research methods, 
computational experimentation provides a powerful approach to addressing difficult 
questions pertaining to organizations.  
Our key departure in this present research pertains to the object of our 
modeling and experimentation. Whereas previous computational modeling and 
experimentation have focused on the structures and behaviors of organizations and 
their operational processes, the focus here is on the processes of change. Clearly 
organizations and their processes are involved in change models too, but the nature 
of such organizations during change is likely to differ in key respects from those not 
undergoing change, and the processes associated with change will clearly differ 
from those involved with routine operations. As an illustrative example, a classical 
manufacturing firm (e.g., US automobile company) would be modeled to represent 
the structure and behavior of its bureaucratic organization and assembly processes. 
But this same firm, when undergoing change, might be modeled instead to represent 
the structure and behavior of a cross-functional, ad-hoc change team and processes 
of organizational redesign and resistance mitigation. 
The computational modeling and experimentation draw heavily upon the 
stream of work associated with the Virtual Design Team (VDT) Research Program 
(VDT, 2006), which has been described in considerable detail elsewhere (e.g., see 
Jin & Levitt, 1996; Kunz et al., 1998; Levitt, et al. 1999), and adapted specifically to 
the acquisition domain by Dillard and Nissen (2005). Adopting the VDT paradigm 
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 brings to bear nearly two decades of research which integrates well-accepted 
organization theory (e.g., Galbraith, 1977; March & Simon, 1958) with extensive 
empirical validation projects (e.g., Christiansen, 1993; Thomsen, 1998), and which 
has demonstrated excellent representational fidelity and both qualitative and 
quantitative validity in terms of operational organizations in practice. This VDT 
paradigm also brings with it a well-refined and validated tool set for modeling the 
structures and emulating the behaviors of operational organizations. 
In this study, we draw both from the qualitative fieldwork and, in particular, the 
theoretical analysis to identify candidate change organizations and processes to 
model. This effort remains highly exploratory, as computational modeling of change 
organizations and processes pushes the state-of-the-art. Indeed, it remains highly 
speculative even whether the VDT computational modeling suite of methods and 
tools can be used to represent and emulate the respective structures and behaviors 
or change organizations and processes. 
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 Qualitative Findings 
To re-iterate from above, the qualitative inquiry sought to answer two, 
interrelated research questions: 1) How does the acquisition manager know when 
change is needed? and 2) What are the enablers and obstacles to create successful 
organizational change? Addressing this first question first, the prevalent case 
suggests that the acquisition manager does not recognize the need for 
organizational change. Admittedly, the multiple interviews did reveal a common 
disdain for “the system” and its many constraints. For instance, we learn from one 
study that acquisition managers feel the “need to fix the program or at least make it 
look like [they’re] going to fix it.” The interviews reveal also that acquisition managers 
take an action-oriented approach. For instance, one study reports that acquisition 
managers will try new techniques: “He was the first program manager to embrace 
integrated product teams (IPTs) and integrated product and process development.”  
But the nature of changes undertaken by acquisition managers in the study 
fell far short of the kinds of organization changes that are noted in the literature and 
emphasized in this study. Indeed, one study reports that “change for change’s sake” 
was common, and another states that “[w]hat the subjects, themselves, referred to 
as change, was very often not an actual change.” Indeed, we find reports of 
signaling change (e.g., through superficial re-organization) playing a larger role than 
change itself does (e.g., “reorganizations look like change”). Further, “[t]he majority 
of changes reported by the interviewees were in some way exogenous”; that is, 
change in its dominant form was imposed from above via hierarchical fiat. Hence, 
external authorities appear able to affect some kind of change upon acquisition 
organizations (e.g., via laws and regulations), but the organizations themselves 
appear unable to affect such change. This serves to reinforce our focus on the 
change process itself as a route toward change without reliance upon legal and 
regulatory authority, a route taken sparingly by previous researchers in this domain. 
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 Addressing the second question reveals many of the enablers and obstacles 
to creating successful organizational change that are known well via both theoretical 
and empirical research on the topic. For instance, the hierarchical organizational 
form itself tends to resist change, and such resistance is noted in one of the studies 
as “constraints on innovation imposed by the military hierarchy.”  As another 
instance, the bureaucratic nature of the acquisition organization hierarchy limits the 
power of acquisition managers: “one of the greatest challenges that a program 
manager is facing is the civilian personnel and civil service—the ability to fire people, 
the ability to hire the right people.”  
We also find risk aversion as another induced attribute of change resistance 
that is noted often in the literature: “one bad choice is likely to result in significant 
repercussions, both personally for the change agent and for the program. […] This 
drives decision makers to look for the lowest-risk option […] [which] quite often 
means not changing at all.” Internal organizational problems surface through our 
studies as well. For instance, “the lack of coordination among the IPT leaders led to 
[a] waste of time and undermined the reputation of the acquisition organization as 
well.” This suggests also a contingency problem of fit (see Burton & Obel, 2004) 
between the hierarchical form of acquisition organizations and their ability to change; 
and it begins to elucidate the insidious and constraining nature of the hierarchy: not 
only does it represent an organizational form that is unsuited in several respects for 
its current, dynamic environment, but this form resists change to other forms. 
Introducing some anthropomorphication here, one could say that the hierarchy is 
stubborn. 
Additionally, we find an apparent absence of foresight among acquisition 
managers that corresponds well to the change literature we explore below. More 
specifically, this is consistent with the assumptions from the Carnegie model of 
decision making and, as we show, suggests that beginning with engineering-focused 
interventions may be self-limiting. For instance, we discover from one study that 
most acquisition managers “seemed not to be looking for an ideal solution, instead 
either choosing a solution from the ‘toolbox’ or adopting a non-ideal […] solution.” 
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 More than one study suggests that acquisition managers—project managers in 
particular—may possess a unique set of capabilities and dispositions, as terms such 
as overly optimistic appear throughout. Indeed, we find considerable evidence that 
acquisition managers possess and defend a very strong sense of identity: a set of 
norms, beliefs and reflexive perceptions that guide both understanding and behavior. 
Even as organizational change is mandated from above, this strong identity prevents 
substantive change from within, and the organizational form itself exacerbates the 
situation, as acquisition managers are relegated to “doing what they can,” and to 
applying “known good solutions (in other situations) to the existing problem.” This 
presents us with something of a paradox: the acquisition organization manifests a 
need to change form, but its very form inhibits such change. 
Alternatively, the studies reveal some potential avenues for change also. For 
instance, within the toolbox notion from above, we find that acquisition organizations 
do change—at least superficially—with some regularity, “moving between 
established organizational repertoires.” We also learn about “administrative effort, 
refocus and ‘change for change’s sake’ that ensued with each leadership turnover.” 
Apparently, the tenure of a typical acquisition manager is relatively short, and, 
hence, acquisition managers tend to change positions relatively frequently. With 
each such leadership change comes an opportunity for organizational change. 
Further, changes with exogenous impetus appear to be accepted with relative ease 
by the acquisition organization: such “changes are generally adopted and acted 
upon with little significant resistance.” Thus, the qualitative results suggest that 
established organizational repertoires may provide feasible avenues for change. 
Perhaps the acquisition organization can be taught novel routines to add to such 
repertoires. Also, each seemingly frequent leadership change could be combined 
with broader, more systematic efforts to redesign the acquisition organization from 
within. As above, however, the current set of acquisition managers may not have 
requisite knowledge to affect such internal redesign, and their strong sense of 
identity may preclude them from committing to the kind of transformational, internal 
change required. The challenge then is formidable. Clearly, if DoD acquisition 
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 organizations are going to change to the degree and depth that managers envision 
is needed, it will constitute nothing less than a change in the collective identity of the 
organization(s). Identity change is a topic we return to below when we consider 
change models and interventions. 
Clearly, we must reach beyond the qualitative data and inductions discussed 
here and draw from theory to understand how such three points could be integrated. 
Further, we must reach in turn beyond such theory, and pursue a program of 
empirical comparison to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of this 
and other approaches to changing the acquisition organization fundamentally. The 
next two sections summarize such theoretical and empirical reaching. 
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 Planned Change 
The qualitative findings above suggest that perhaps the field of organizational 
change can shed some light on the challenge facing Acquisition Organizations. This 
focused review of the change literature relevant to our study is organized into five 
parts: 1) Models of Planned Change, 2) Change Typologies and Planning the Flow 
of intervention types, 3) Intervention Models within DoD, 4) Sense-making as a tool 
to understand change processes, and 5) the Logic for beginning with socializing 
interventions and Large-scale Change.  
Models of Planned Change  
As many have noted, planned change is usually initiated because of the need 
for an organization to adapt. Representations and typologies depicting change 
approaches vary. Some emphasize the level of planned change as first or second 
order (Bartunek & Moch, 1987); some emphasize degree of change (incremental or 
radical); others emphasize the target of planned change; others the pace of change 
or the tempo of change (episodic or continuous). First, we investigate the kind of 
change involved in moving an acquisition organization from bureaucratic to 
holonistic, or what we are calling “power to the edge” (see Alberts & Hayes, 2003), 
using Dunphy’s (1997) typology. This helps us appreciate the radical nature of 
change. It also provides a logic for why it is necessary to focus on the theory 
underlying the intervention (in this case, the nature of sense-making as a way to 
understand human behavior during radical change), and finally, the logic for why 
socializing interventions and large group interventions are appropriate because they 
tend to account for the nature of sense-making in cases such as the one we are 
exploring.  
Dunphy suggests that any theory of change must account for five 
components: 1) basic metaphor of the organization; 2) analytic framework; 3) ideal 
model; 4) intervention theory; and 5) role of change agent. We explore these 
components and consider how they apply to the case of changing from bureaucracy 
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 to holonistic, or “edge-like” organizations. Dunphy suggests that any change 
intervention must account for: 1) a basic metaphor of the nature of organization; 2) 
an analytic framework or diagnostic model to understand the change process; 3) an 
ideal model of an effective organization that includes targeted outcomes; 4) an 
intervention theory that specifies where, when and how to intervene; 5) a definition 
of the role of the change agents.  
Change in the basic metaphor of the organization: from centralized power 
to “edge” power. The bureaucratic metaphor sees organization as predictable, 
relying on patterned routines; change is infrequent and driven from the top; 
interdependence is usually sequential and coordination occurs through plans. The 
holonistic metaphor envisions an organization that is emergent, self-organizing; 
people are empowered to make decisions based on knowledge and expertise rather 
than by authority position; change is constant, evolving, and cumulative. 
Interdependence is often reciprocal, and coordination occurs through negotiation.  
Change in analytic framework. Bureaucracies seek equilibrium, so change 
is seen as an occasional interruption or divergence. Changes are often driven 
externally and often seen as a failure to adapt. Adaptations tend to be short run and 
scope tends to be macro or global. In holonistic organizations, change is seen as an 
endless modification in work processes and social practice driven by alert reactions 
to daily contingencies; small accommodations cumulate and amplify. Change efforts 
emphasize long-run adaptability at the micro level. The key change is redistribution 
of decision rights and expertise to the edge of organization.  
Ideal Model of effective organization: the ideal model of the mechanistic 
organization is one of efficiency and predictability, hierarchically ordered, in which 
planning and decisions occur at the strategic apex and are implemented at lower 
levels. The holonistic organization is one in which power is distributed to the edge; 
individuals are able to “sense and respond,” are empowered to initiate actions and 
changes when the situation arises. As a result, this organization is capable of 
continued adaptation.  
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 Intervention theory: A bureaucratic acquisition organization is rule-driven 
and seeks to minimize disruptions. This tends to be consistent with a model of 
“punctuated equilibrium.” In a holonistic organization, change is continuous (Van de 
Ven &  Poole, 1995). Executives are encouraged to notice instability, disorder, 
novelty, emergence, and self-organization for their innovative potential rather than 
as something to be avoided, eliminated, or controlled. This approach to change 
tends to be consistent with complexity theory in which the unexpected and unknown 
are resources for novel action, a responsive organization that operates at the “edge 
of chaos.” Rather than change perceived as something that must be anticipated, 
planned, and controlled, change is anticipated, unplanned and facilitated. Also, 
agents are richly connected (rather than functionally separated), and feedback is 
non-linear (rather than exclusively guided by chain-of-command norms). This last 
observation should be enough to signal that this is indeed a radical change that 
challenges habitual sense-making norms. (For this reason, below we explore in 
more detail traditional decision making theory that informs DoD bureaucracies and 
the need to understand the process of sense-making as a guide to choosing 
interventions that align with theories of sense-making).  
Role of Change agent: Traditional acquisition organizations in which change 
is planned and occasional, change agents tend to be located in positions of 
hierarchical power. The change agent is seen as a prime mover who plans and 
directs, communicates action plans, builds coordination. In holonistic organizations 
(in which power is distributed), change agents are sense-makers who redirect the 
flow of change, focus on changes in the margins, facilitated improvisation, 
responsiveness, and learning.  
By exploring each of these 5 components, we can see more clearly that the 
proposed change in DoD acquisition organizations is, in fact, radical along each of 
the dimensions. For our purposes, we explore in more detail below the change in 
intervention theory that is involved. Therefore, we begin by exploring a range of 
change typologies.  
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 Change Typologies  
One of the most enduring typologies of organizational change is the one 
proposed by Van de Ven and Poole (1995). They explore four basic process 
theories of change and posit different event sequences and generative mechanisms: 
1) lifecycle theories, 2) teleological theories, 3) dialectical theories, and 4) 
evolutionary theories. By definition, planned change approaches are teleological. 
Huy (2001) further elaborates the teleological model by outlining four different 
engines (or intervention theories) and, correspondingly, different kinds of change 
agents that are called for: 1) commanding approaches which are directed toward 
formal work structures; 2) engineering approaches directed towards work processes 
and job design; 3) teaching approaches that are directed toward beliefs; and 4) 
socializing approaches directed toward social relationships. These are ideal type 
models, and most large-scale change efforts involve combinations, if not inclusion, 
of all four intervention approaches. Therefore, we also seek to understand the 
importance of the order and combination of these approaches as we apply these 
types to DoD organizations.  
Commanding Interventions: are aimed at changes in formal structures. 
Much of the strategic management literature assumes a commanding change 
model. Change agents tend to take on the role of commander engaging in activities 
like strategic planning, competitive analyses, and portfolio management. These 
efforts are traditionally directed by “top team.” Efforts are directed to get the rest of 
the organization to comply with the dominant coalition’s plans. This is an appropriate 
mode when change targets are tangible (Theory E), such as changing people, 
downsizing, restructuring. This is not the kind of approach that would be successful if 
the goal was to change beliefs or values. When change needs to be quick and 
produce an immediate effect, commanding approaches are appropriate. As we 
hinted earlier and explore more fully below, commanding interventions are almost 
always the initial model in DoD systems.  
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 Engineering Interventions: tend to be focused on work processes. Re-
engineering efforts, total quality efforts, socio-technical and job-design changes are 
engineering interventions. They include efforts to redesign business processes; 
efforts directed at cost, quality, service and speed are engineering interventions. 
Change agents tend to focus on analyzing detailed work specifications and 
redesigning work processes to improve quality of production. Change targets are 
seen as rational (motivated by economic self-interest). Change agents tend to be 
task analysts who diagnose work processes and organizational designs. In 
engineering intervention, efficiency is the most important goal.  
Teaching interventions: tend to be focused on changing beliefs. This often 
involves teaching about ideas, values, points of view, how to motivate people, 
decision-making capacity, awareness of mental models, similar to what Chin and 
Benne called a normative-re-educative method. Efforts are made to uncover 
participants’ values and beliefs. Much of this work is cognition based; targets are 
often cognitive dysfunctions and culture change. Change agents tend to have a-
priori models. (As we explore more fully below, teaching holonistic organizing 
principles to people in DoD organizations is a sizable challenge).  
Socializing interventions: Socializing interventions pertain to changes in 
social relationships and involve power distribution and alterations in decision-making 
patterns. Examples of socializing interventions include team building and semi-
autonomous work groups. The assumption here is that changes in roles and 
behaviors precede changes in beliefs. Following socio-technical systems theory, the 
assumption is that social learning processes occur mostly within groups. Most of 
these interventions are efforts to create semi-autonomous work groups; empowered 
decision-making in an effort to adapt to unpredictable environments or changing 
circumstances; to permit decisions to be made at the point where action is needed 
(as opposed to referring decisions to others who have authority but lack intimate 
knowledge of problems needing to be addressed). Change agents tend to be 
facilitators and coaches.  
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 As we look at the effort to change from Bureaucratic to Decentralized or 
Holonistic organization, it is clear that this is a teleological, goal-directed change; it 
can be argued that all four of the intervention models above are needed.  It is also 
important to consider what combinations and which order of intervention models 
should be deployed. Acquisition organizations will not change unless commanders 
set direction and vision, describe and communicate clearly necessity for change, 
determine formal organizational arrangements that should be target for change and 
which elements are off limits; and analyze environmental impacts (commanding 
intervention).  Decentralized or holonistic organization will certainly involve a detailed 
analyses of work specifications, and a redesign in work processes (engineering 
interventions). Such a radical transformation will involve different beliefs, values, 
motivators for participants; new skills will need to be developed to aid in decision-
making capabilities and team development (teaching interventions). Relational 
patterns and modes of interdependence will certainly be altered (socializing 
interventions).  
Intervention Models within DoD 
While all successful change efforts tend to favor one of the above models for 
change, they tend to require combinations of the intervention models, if not all four. 
The question emerges: what is the most appropriate change model for moving 
acquisition organization from bureaucratic to power-dispersed? The DoD usually 
leads with command, teaching, and engineering interventions. Unfortunately, these 
interventions are not up to the task of the kind of pervasive change needed to move 
toward edge-like structures, in which decision rights are distributed to various actors. 
One of the reasons that engineering interventions do not work is that they are based 
on quasi-rationalistic models of decision making. Such models of decision making 
are appropriate when goals are clear and tasks are stable. This is not the case in 
holonistic structures, and is not the case during transition to edge-like structures.  
In order to understand how humans behave under conditions of discontinuous 
change and flux, we need a different model of decision-making and action. Here we 
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 review common approaches to decision-making and explore the concept of sense-
making. We argue that what sense-making theories allow us to see is how people 
attempt to create meaning and order out of equivocal experiences; sense-making 
processes involve retrospective efforts, involve social processes, and depend upon 
notions of identity maintenance and construction. Because edge-like transformations 
are radical and will require multiple efforts of sense-making, we then ask an 
important question: what is the best intervention to enhance sense-making capacity 
in a way that guides actors to act in edge-like manner? We argue that skills in 
sense-making processes are best developed and managed within the context of 
socialization interventions.   
In this section, we argue that the proper “order” of change interventions 
should be: commanding, teaching, socialization, and finally, engineering. The most 
important part of our argument is the proposal that socialization is a necessary mode 
of intervention because of the depth and pervasiveness of change and sense-
making necessary to become an edge-like organization. We also demonstrate that a 
change process using socialization methods, while most promising, is also more 
costly in terms of time and resources.  
Traditional models of interventions in DoD organizations: Here we discuss the 
traditional model of change intervention utilized in DoD efforts. Most change 
interventions within the DoD begin with commanding interventions and are followed 
by teaching and engineering interventions. Recall that command interventions are 
changes in structure. In DoD organizations, leaders frequently announce changes in 
organizational structure, changes in reporting relationships. These efforts from the 
top are teaching interventions that propose new metaphors, such as “budgets are 
battles to be won,” cost control helps to “win the war on terror,” for example. These 
are then followed by engineering interventions—efforts to streamline processes. 
There are other familiar examples of DoD command interventions and teaching 
interventions followed by engineering interventions. The Total Quality Management 
Movement in the 80’s and the Business Process Re-engineering Movement in the 
90’s provide myriad examples of such engineering interventions. It is usually the 
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 engineering interventions that count as “real” change in DoD because they are 
measurable; and it is here that work processes change. It is worthwhile exploring the 
limitations of focusing on engineering interventions when changes in identity are 
called for.  
The problem with engineering interventions in the context of radical change:  
Engineering models assume that individual decision making is rational in 
orientation; that problem identification is clear, that there is access to alternatives 
and that viable problem solutions can be attained; that decisions can be 
programmed, that is, that repetitive, well-defined procedures exist to find a solution 
to analyzable tasks. An engineering model of change tends to assume a view of 
people as rational, economic actors, people who have extensive information and rich 
frames to guide decision-making and action.  
The engineering model of intervention that assumes the rational mode of 
decision-making is optimal when goals are clear. Rational choice models of behavior 
and engineering-focused interventions are appropriate when evaluating problems in 
relation to stable goals, when actions are chosen from various sets of alternatives. 
Accurate information and accurate perception are especially important in these 
models for evaluating the feasibility of alternatives. However, a DoD organization 
moving toward an edge model does not fit this conception; goals are emergent and 
transient. We are more likely to encounter an amorphous flux of activity that must be 
bracketed as meaningful and relevant before any action alternatives emerge. 
Further, we imagine that managers in edge climates will be faced with several 
problems, interpretations, action scenarios simultaneously. In these conditions, 
accuracy of perception might not be as important as creating a credible 
interpretation or narrative. What’s needed is the capacity to make sense of situations 
in a way that coordinates action and moves the organization forward in desired 
ways.  
The point here is that engineering interventions, legitimized by rational and 
analytic tools, are appropriate only after change to an edge-like climate has 
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 occurred. During the process of transition, engineering methods are likely to 
escalate commitment to an undesired course of action and “refreeze” behavior too 
soon.  
Efforts to modify rational decision making models—the Carnegie Model:  
There have been several attempts to modify the rational decision making 
model, in particular the March and Simon, or Carnegie model. March and Simon 
challenged this model of decision making—most situations in organizations are non-
programmed; that is, situations are novel, poorly defined, and no procedure exists 
for finding a solution. This “bounded rationality” perspective assumes that people 
have limited time, information, and resources, that organizational and social 
constraints limit the potential for fully rational solutions.  The Carnegie model of 
decision making assumes that constraints create conditions of bounded rationality, 
that there is usually disagreement about goals and priorities, that decision making is 
political, that managers form coalitions and, through political processes, arrive at 
goals and priorities; and satisfice (that is, look around for quick solutions in the 
immediate, local environment rather than searching for the optimal solution) rather 
than optimize.  
The March and Simon framework emphasizes habit in explaining choice-
making and behaviors. This helps to explain the persistence of behaviors and 
routines, but does not address the initiation of new behaviors. It helps to explain 
when and how engineering interventions are appropriate, too. But because such a 
bounded rationality model does not focus on the process that surrounds bounded 
rationality, it is not useful for understanding the dynamics of radical change, for 
understanding how people adjust to radically changing circumstances. Also, it is 
limited to individual frames of reference, and does not account for the process by 
which choices are considered and made. This would require accounting for the 
larger social processes. Hence, although the bounded rationality model reflects 
improvement over the engineering approach that is common to DoD change, it too is 
inadequate in helping us understand the kinds of change required to transform into 
Edge-like, Holonistic organizations. To better understand how people respond to 
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 change within the context of social groups, we must turn to the model of sense-
making.   
Sense Making as a Tool to Understand Change Processes 
One heuristic for understanding human behavior when actors are thrown into 
the flux of everyday events, making sense of changing context, is to explore the 
concept of sense-making. Sense-making refers to how people structure the 
unknown and is a useful framework for making sense of organizational change 
(Mills, 2003). Following Weick, “people make sense of things by seeing a world on 
which they have already imposed what they believe.”  Sense-making is not a body of 
theory, but a recipe for analysis (Weick, 1995), a site where people construct 
meaning, constrain action, and construct identity. 
Sense-making is explicit and “visible” under conditions of surprise and unmet 
expectations, when events are perceived to be different from what was expected; or 
when the meaning of events is so unclear that actors do not know how to engage 
the world. In these moments, there is a shift from what Heidegger called the “ready 
to hand” mode, in which one is coping or immersed in the flow of events, to the 
“unready to hand mode,” in which action is disrupted and people must reflect or 
introspect to access reasons for engaging. The scripts and rationales that people 
look for in attempting to re-engage the world are drawn from organizational and 
institutional settings, past routines, plans and procedures. Following Mills, a sense-
making framework “can be used to explain how/why particular change programmes 
are adopted in the face of evidence of their shortcomings, and why, despite every 
effort, some managers unilaterally reject such attempts at change” (p. 50). One of 
the reasons that a sense-making framework is useful in this project is that we are 
seeking to understand how acquisition professionals will act under proposals for 
radical change. Sense-making theory proposes that they will draw upon 
organizational settings and past routines, familiar plans and procedures to make 
sense of novel stimuli as a way to move forward. It is a useful framework to 
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 understand how knowledge unfolds piecemeal as people attempt to coordinate and 
circulate information.  
For our purposes, we would like to draw out two of the essential properties of 
sense-making—identity construction and the social nature of sense-making. Within 
the ongoing stream of activity, people begin to notice and bracket; they carve cues 
from an undifferentiated flux. Bracketing and labeling are forms of simplification. 
Imposing labels trigger a particular kind of diagnostic treatment and will suggest 
modes of acting, managing, coordinating, etc. What is important for our purposes is 
to highlight that the way events are first envisioned begins the process: noticing, 
bracketing and labeling are efforts to reduce uncertainty and transience and begin to 
create order out of chaos; once events are bracketed and labeled, people are 
disposed to find ways to act. Following Weick et al. (2005):  
In the context of everyday life, when people confront something unintelligible 
and ask “what’s the story here?” their question has the force of bringing an event 
into existence. When people then ask “What do I do?” this question has the force of 
bringing meaning into existence, meaning that they hope is stable enough for them 
to act into the future, continue to act, and to have the sense that they remain in 
touch with the continuing flow of experience. (p. 410)  
Most situations are routine and do not demand explicit sense-making or full 
attention. Under conditions of habit and routine, people rely upon prototypic cases, 
encouraging stable action. When peripheral cases arise that are equivocal, however, 
action becomes indeterminate and variable, candidates to change organization and 
adaptive patterns, and sense-making efforts are engaged. People attempt to grasp 
fleeting meaning, continually revising an emerging story that gradually becomes 
comprehensive enough that it persists and is available as a resource for people to 
draw on in future sense-making efforts. What’s important is to create and retain 
plausible stories. In DoD interventions, when people face uncertainty and look 
around for meaningful guides, they are likely to revert to familiar recipes and scripts 
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 that are consistent with bureaucratic and mechanistic routines, patterns that would 
undo edge-like ideals.  
Also, in the DoD there may be a tendency for people to speak as if they are 
trying to get the story “right,” perceiving events accurately (and in this case, perhaps 
interpreting the accuracy of legal constraints). However, sense-making efforts are 
not about discovering the “truth,” for truth is constructed socially within most of the 
social domain associated with organizational change. Although asserting and 
obtaining agreement on some common version of “truth” may be an important factor 
for motivation, this approach fails to acknowledge the social construction of 
organizational reality, which rarely results in a common construction. Rather, sense-
making efforts seek to create a plausible story (Weick et al., 2005). It is through such 
plausible stories that people interpret their environment, and the stories themselves 
become “truth”—often only implicitly—via social construction and agreement. Stories 
will be more plausible, especially in the early stages, when they link with prior 
stories, when events can be seen as exemplars of familiar principles and stories. 
Further, as these stories facilitate ongoing action, they become increasingly 
plausible. Hence, the process builds upon itself, until a large-scale organizational 
reality has been created through successive accretion of linked, plausible stories for 
making sense. 
The notion that sense-making is directed toward plausibility rather than 
accuracy (Weick, 1995) conflicts with many academic theories, as well as the culture 
of the DoD. When attempting change in this case, it’s important to realize that the 
climate of the DoD will be geared toward accuracy. Therefore, we would expect 
many of the early attempts at sense-making to be framed in terms of “correctness” 
and “accurate behaviors.” Even though edge organizations offer multiple variants of 
possible behaviors, few of them can be deemed “accurate” in advance of execution. 
Hence, accuracy as a driver for choice and behavior is a goal consistent with rational 
choice versions of human behavior, and we would expect this to assume a more 
salient theme during the engineering stage of change intervention. Alternatively, in 
the shorter-term phases of change toward Holonistic organizations, it’s important to 
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 appreciate that plausible stories keep things moving. This is why we argue below 
that large group interventions (LGIs) are appropriate for holonistic change. LGIs 
suspend routine solutions and encourage a proliferation of various narratives which 
then become candidates for plausible meaning-making long enough to guide 
actions, which in turn reinforce plausibility.  
Disruption triggers and identity construction:  
We examine now disruptions as triggers for sense-making. Since sense-
making is the continual search for, and creation of, meaning and identity, we would 
expect to find explicit efforts at sense-making when the perceived world is 
significantly different from “world as expected.” Two types of sense-making 
occasions common to organization are ambiguity and uncertainty. The “shock” in 
each case is somewhat different. In the case of ambiguity, people engage in sense-
making because they are confused by too many interpretations; whereas in the case 
of uncertainty, they do so because they are ignorant of any interpretations (Weick, 
1995, pp. 91-92). We assume for purposes of the present study that DoD 
professionals will be working and acting under conditions of uncertainty, unclear of 
interpretations, and will search for various scripts and familiar narratives to make 
sense of events. They will draw upon past stories, past routines and institutionalized 
scripts to make sense of these aberrant events. One goal, then, of such 
interventions is to shift from uncertainty to ambiguity to create multiple narratives as 
guides to action.  
Now we are equipped to examine identity construction. Identity construction is 
at the base of sense-making activities and undergirds the efforts to stabilize 
meaning: sense-makers are preoccupied with identity construction. Following Weick, 
“people learn about their identities by projecting them into an environment and 
observing the consequences” (Weick, 1995). Shocks that threaten identity trigger 
attempts to construct a stable, positive, efficacious identity. When people confront an 
unexpected situation, such as the prospect of changing from bureaucratic to “edge-
like,” this will translate into identity questions; people will wonder who they are and 
what matters. As they act, they are likely to notice cues and triggers that enhance a 
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 sense of self efficacy. These stories help to frame the way people will commit to 
streams of actions.  
Regarding social dynamics and sense-making, highlighting individual identity 
risks ignoring the social-relational nature of sense-making. Sense-making is a social 
activity. When unfamiliar contexts arise, people are likely to ask themselves whether 
the new situation is the same or different than prior situations. Multiple possible 
meanings become occasions for diagnosis and action strategies, attempts to reduce 
equivocality by seeking shared understanding. Actors will be faced with a dilemma of 
too many or too few possible meanings, and are likely to attend to how others frame, 
interpret, diagnose, and act.  
As action unfolds, people’s hunches become enmeshed with the task of 
seeking one another out for advice, looking for specialists to confirm an 
interpretation or to take action. Shared understandings of the “correct” action to take 
emerges through continual, iterative talk. Both talk and action are central to sense-
making. Action creates more information and opportunities for negotiation and 
opportunities to increase one’s sense of what is going on. Actions enable people to 
assess causal beliefs that subsequently lead to new actions undertaken to test the 
newly asserted relationships. Over time, as supporting evidence mounts, significant 
changes in beliefs and actions evolve (Weick et al., 2005, p. 416). 
People will be testing hunches, experimenting, acting on “as if” beliefs, linking 
the concrete and personal with the abstract and impersonal. The question about 
what to do next will be linked to resistance as there is temptation to repeat familiar 
scripts. Scott (2003) maintains that organizations cannot be properly understood 
separate from their wider social and cultural contexts. Then, perhaps, if we were to 
understand the change process within this context, we would need to account for 
wider institutional trends. What are the broader cognitive, normative and regulatory 
forces that impinge on actors? What agencies, professions, and interest groups do 
these actors confront? If no other groups within the DoD move toward edge-like 
structures, then these outside interpretations might trump any internal effort to re-
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 28- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 interpret distributed decision making as effective organizing. It is probable that public 
discourse will aid in directing members’ attention in setting agendas and framing 
issues in legalistic terms. Given this tendency, we are more convinced of the need 
for socializing interventions.  
The Logic for Beginning with Socializing Interventions and 
Large-scale Change 
Recall from above our discussion of Dunphy’s components of change theory; 
we outline various elements of change. In the case of DoD acquisition organizations, 
we argue that we must appreciate the nature of the task and how it is likely to 
change. Under bureaucratic and legalistic norms, tasks are structured sequentially. 
Sequential interdependence requires minimal interaction. Actors can research 
procedures and rules with minimal need for interpretation.  Re-allocating decision 
rights under holonistic norms of self organizing has implications for the structure of 
tasks. Under these conditions, we would expect more equivocality in acquisition 
requests, the need for more interpretation in order to attain understanding in 
considering action choices, and also social processes to understand consequences 
of action. Rules and regulations will no longer serve as the primary or exclusive form 
of constraint. Actors will negotiate meaning (and perhaps resources). In short, the 
tasks themselves will move from sequential to reciprocal interdependence. There will 
be greater need for scheduled and unscheduled meetings. Meetings and exchanges 
will not necessarily lead to clear decisions and actions, but will likely require further 
negotiation and meetings. Further, since actors will now live with repercussions of 
their own decisions, learning needs to continue to occur after a decision is made. 
Decision-makers will do more research and inquiry into short- and long-term 
consequences of decisions. Cultural norms and beliefs will gradually become guides 
for action. New norms of responsibility will develop. There will be a temptation for 
actors to become more risk averse as personal responsibility increases and as the 
need for informed decisions based on well-grounded interpretation increases.  In 
short, changing from mechanistic to holonistic forms of organizing is a disruption of 
several components; new forms of social relationships are required that involve 
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 participation and negotiation of multiple stakeholders to engage in sense-making 
activities. One socialization intervention that seems appropriate is the large group 
intervention. We now discuss the nature of large group interventions and discuss 
one in particular—the appreciative inquiry summit.  
One of the most promising recent advances in the field of organizational 
development and change is the area of large-scale change. Traditional change 
techniques have focused on work with individuals and small groups. The field has 
moved to focus from micro organizational issues to macro, large-system issues. (In 
attempting major, second-order change of the type we are discussing here, it is 
questionable whether working at the small-group level can accomplish much).   
A range of techniques and methods have evolved over the last decade, 
including search conference, future search, real-time strategic change, Simu-Real, 
whole-system design, fast-cycle full participation and appreciative inquiry summits. 
What these methods have in common is the focus on large groups of people 
simultaneously strategizing and creating change plans. Most of these methods 
assume that participants can shape and decide upon issues in the organization and 
its environment; most include a majority of organizational members and 
stakeholders. These methods are highly participative; divergent voices are included. 
Techniques are designed to help the organization be responsive and adaptive by 
providing ways to get the entire system to dialogue about the organizational situation 
and context. Dialogue between members leads to reframing; efforts are made to 
search for agreement for action strategies and cooperative effort to accomplish 
agreed-upon goals. These techniques promise to implement change with greater 
speed than traditional techniques. In most of these models, change 
agents/consultants act as facilitators. The appreciative inquiry summit is one large-
scale change intervention and follows Weisbord’s (1992) dictum to “get the whole 
system in the room.”  
The Appreciative Inquiry (AI) Summit involves a broad range of internal and 
external stakeholders in the process. It involves commanding interventions and a 
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 steering committee to name the strategic topic that focuses the change efforts. In the 
case of transforming a DoD acquisition organization, we would assume that the 
strategic topic would need to account for customer requirements in terms of speed 
and efficiency; the need to empower workers at all levels to respond to customer 
needs with a minimum of regulatory requirements. Since the goal is to involve the 
entire system if possible, numerous stakeholders would be invited—including 
suppliers, customers, representatives from every rank and function (relationship 
intervention).  
It typically begins with a single event or series of events (usually 3-5 days in 
length) that bring people together to: 1) discover the organization or community’s 
core competencies and strengths; 2) envision opportunities for positive change; 3) 
design the desired changes into the organization or community’s systems, 
structures, strategies, and culture; and 4) implement and sustain the changes and 
make them work through changes in work processes (engineering interventions). AI 
Summits range from 30 to 3000 people and can include more using online 
technology. Because of the power of wholeness and democratic self-organizing, the 
closer Summits get to including every member of the system, the more dramatic and 
sustainable the impact.  
Advocates of summits claim that they tend to engender commitment and 
follow through. Summits are designed to maximize wholeness, strategic visioning, 
learning, and relating. They require large, arena-type spaces with groups of eight to 
ten diverse participants. Everyone helps address tasks while taking responsibility for 
their own utterances, actions, perceptions, and feelings. Members do not stay in the 
same groups for the entire summit, but assemble into various stakeholder groups—
departmental groupings, customers, suppliers, and others. Although each AI Summit 
is unique, all are designed to flow through the appreciative inquiry 4-D cycle of 
discovery, dream, design, and destiny.  
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 Day 1: Discovery—discovering and connecting the many facets of the 
organization’s “positive core”: the strengths, assets, competencies, capabilities, 
values, traditions, wisdoms, and potentials that fuel and sustain its success.  
Day 2: Dream—envisioning the organization’s future in bold and specific 
terms.  
Day 3: Design—designing the “social architecture” (e.g., strategies, 
structures, systems, culture, processes, partnerships) to give form to members’ 
dreams. 
Day 4: Destiny—planning for action and change in work processes. Individual 
commitments are made, innovation teams formed, strategic initiatives launched, and 
large-group dialogue promotes organizational alignment. Additionally, the next steps 
in the change process are launched. Essentially, these are engineering 
interventions.  
Large group interventions (specifically AI summits) are good enablers for 
major change required to move to holonistic organizations because they: increase 
facility in sense-making by providing opportunities for divergent stakeholders to 
share perspectives, suspend habitual recipes for actions, invite various narratives 
and scenarios that become candidates for plausible guides for actions, invite people 
to experiment with new actions, provide positive images for possible action, 
encourage an action orientation so that people can begin with action first (followed 
by belief and understanding), encourage people to make public commitments to new 
actions making it harder to revert to previous comfortable patterns, create arenas for 
people to discover areas of agreement rather than replay old conflicts, invite people 
to take a holistic, systemic perspective so that sub-optimization is discouraged.  
The large group intervention is an appropriate model for change because: 1) 
it models edge-like organizational structures of guided autonomy within a controlled 
space; 2) it invites multiple stakeholders and voices, including voices exogenous to 
the organization (such as customers) to jointly create narratives, meaning, and 
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 consider identity transformation; 3) the joint meaning and definitions that emerge 
from large group interventions become the ground from which engineering 
interventions then become appropriate; 4) LGIs build on the positive and invite 
sense-making that builds on the positive factors in the past and facilitates possible 
actions into the future.  
Computational Experimentation 
The first step in developing computational models of the change process is 
ontological: members must identify what aspects of the world will exist 
representationally in the model. The VDT modeling suite comes equipped with an 
explicit representational ontology, so this step becomes more one of mapping than 
of creation. Specifically, we map the kinds of organizational and processual 
considerations discussed above onto the VDT modeling suite. The key comparison 
we seek to examine through computational models is between the kinds of 
command- and engineering-first approaches to change—which we note above are 
common in the DoD—and the kinds of socialization-first approach instantiated 
through large group interventions. The former falls relatively close to the types of 
organizations and processes that have been modeled to date via VDT, so we begin 
there. We leave models of the latter to our future research agenda. Here, we 
describe a preliminary model of one change process described above: command-
first change. We then discuss some insightful manipulations of this model, and close 
with comments linking back to the findings above. 
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 Command-First Model 
 
Figure 1. SimVision Change Process Diagram 
Figure 1 delineates a screendump from SimVision, a commercial 
implementation of the VDT modeling tool set, which depicts the organizational 
structure and task structure associated with a command-first change process. The 
green person icons represent the organization structure, with Top Management at 
the top. In the case of acquisition organizations, Top Management would likely 
consist of the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) and multiple Program Executive 
Officers (PEOs). In this model, we include four PEOs to work as a top-management 
team with the SAE. Although these leaders have considerable skill and application 
experience in acquisition, we presume that their skill and application experience in 
large scale change is minimal. Alternatively, reporting to this top-management team 
is a small team of (5) experts and consultants with comparatively high skill and 
application experience in large scale change. Such experts and consultants are 
brought in for their change-management expertise, and they serve to drive much of 
the change effort. Reporting to this top-management team also is a Staff Lead, who 
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 is in charge of a relatively small team of (10) workers who perform most of the 
considerable staff work associated with the change process. A team of (10) line-
project managers report to the top-management team also, but their focus is on day-
to-day, operational project activities, not the change process per se. We include 
them here for reference, along with a relatively large team of (1000) project workers, 
who likewise focus on operational activities, not process change. In this scheme, the 
hierarchical lines of authority also depict the lines of communication and decision-
making for the change process. 
The yellow boxes depict work activities associated with the change process. 
We include four activities—command, teaching, engineering and announcement—
arranged sequentially, and interspersed between two milestone events—ConOps 
Complete and Teaching Complete—that denote both progress and transition 
between phases of the change process. For instance, the Teaching activity does not 
begin until after the Command activity is complete, the latter of which is signaled by 
the ConOps Complete milestone. Likewise, the Engineering activity does not begin 
until after the Teaching activity is complete and the Teaching Complete milestone is 
reached. The Announcement activity follows completion of the Engineering activity in 
turn, and represents the final activity before the change process is (deemed) 
complete.  
Each activity is specified with a value for work volume, which quantifies the 
level of effort required generally for adequately skilled actors to complete. The 
values specified for the four activities are 50, 50, 1000 and 5 person-days, 
respectively. In the case of Command, for instance, the 50 person-days would be 
accomplished by a team of five, competent, Top Management actors in roughly ten 
workdays (i.e., 50 person-days divided by 5 actors equals 10 days). The same 
applies to the other activities. The red links between the activities depict rework. As 
exceptions are encountered with the Teaching activity, for instance, this implies that 
some aspects (roughly 10%) of the Command activity must be redone. It is likewise 
the case for exceptions encountered in the Engineering and Announcement 
activities, which impact Teaching and Engineering, respectively. Dark-blue lines from 
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 the actors to the activities depict primary task responsibilities, and, hence, link the 
organization structure with the task structure. 
The three magenta trapezoid shapes depict standing meetings that require 
participation by various organizational actors over specified periods of time. First, the 
ConOps Meetings take place two hours each week—and involve Top Management, 
Experts & Consultants and Staff Lead—from project start through the end of 
Command activities (i.e., the ConOps Complete milestone). These meetings are 
driven by Top Management and focus on the nature of change envisioned for the 
organization; participation is limited to this relatively small team of senior leaders and 
staff members.  
Second, the Instruction Meetings take place two hours each day from 
ConOps Complete through the end of Teaching activities (i.e., the Teaching 
Complete milestone). These meetings are driven by Experts & Consultants and 
focus on how to transform the organization; participation is limited to Experts, 
Consultants, Staff Lead and Staff. Third, the Implementation Meetings take place 
two hours each week from Teaching Complete through the end of Engineering and 
Announcement activities (i.e., the Finish milestone). These meetings are driven by 
Staff and focus on redesigning the organization’s work processes in detail; 
participation is limited to Experts, Consultants, Staff Lead and Staff. Notice that Line 
Managers and Workers do not get involved directly in this change process. 
However, their various organizations are represented by temporary membership on 
the Staff involved with the change process. This model provides us with the ability to 
examine and specify the change organization in considerable detail. 
This model provides us also with the ability to simulate the performance of 
this change organization across an array of measures. A select set of performance 
measures and simulated values is summarized in Table 2 for this command-first 
model of change. The duration measure (350 days) quantifies the elapsed time for 
completion of the change process activities that are depicted in the model. Hence, 
our performance emulation suggests that nearly one calendar year would be 
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 required for the four activities represented in this command-first change process. 
Notice this excludes the subsequent time and effort required for the organization 
itself to change; that is, here we model the process of planning for change, but we 
exclude the process of implementing change, the latter of which will likely dwarf the 
former in terms of time, cost and risk. It remains for future research to develop such 
latter model, as we can take only one step at a time in this exploratory effort. 
Table 2. Simulated Performance 
Measure Command 
Duration 350 days 
Cost $245K 
Work Volume 1105 P-days 
Rework 298 P-days 
Coordination 275 P-days 
Wait 16 P-days 
Project Risk .343 
Backlog 11 days (Staff) 
 
The cost measure ($245K) indicates that roughly a quarter million dollars 
would be required to complete this change process. This figure is likely to be biased 
low, but we would need to calibrate the model to compensate in an informed 
manner. Such calibration remains for future research also. But even before 
calibration, because costs are simulated in the same way across different models, 
we would be able to evaluate comparative costs between alternate change 
processes (e.g., change-first vs. socialization-first). The same applies to all 
simulated performance measures. Indeed, the computational model enables precise 
control over which specific variables are changed between any one model and 
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 The next four measures listed in the table all have the same units of person-
days (P-days), which represent the number of actors multiplied by the number of 
days they are involved in an activity. For instance, if ten actors work for one day on a 
particular task, this would represent 10 P-days. As noted above, Work Volume 
represents the amount of effort that would be required by adequately competent 
actors performing all of the change-process activities. The 1105 P-days indicate 
nearly three person-years of effort, and all values (e.g., Duration, Work Volume, 
others) exclude time off for evenings, weekends, holidays and other planned non-
working periods. The Rework measure quantifies the level of work associated with 
correcting problems caused by exceptions. At 298 P-days, Rework amounts to more 
than a quarter of the Work Volume. Coordination pertains to time and effort required 
to plan, interact and monitor the change process, which includes time spent in 
meetings, asking questions, and providing answers. At 275 P-days, the coordination 
effort is sizeable, nearly equaling that of Rework, and indicating that coordination 
amounts to nearly a quarter of the Work Volume. The Wait measure estimates the 
time spent by subordinates waiting for superiors to make decisions and provide 
guidance and answers that are needed. At 16 P-days, workers do not spend very 
much time waiting, comparatively. 
Project risk assesses the fraction of exceptions that are not addressed 
completely or not addressed at all. Clearly not all project exceptions need to be 
addressed, but the more exceptions that are left unaddressed, or are unaddressed 
completely, the greater the chance of a major issue afflicting the change process. 
Hence, this measure quantifies the relative effort that would have to be expended—
over and above that contributing to the work, coordination, cost and duration 
discussed above—to remedy all of the exceptions encountered through the change 
process. The value (0.343) is substantial but not uncommon. Were we to include 
change-process implementation in addition to the planning effort above, this value 
would increase appreciably no doubt. Finally, Backlog measures the maximum 
number of days’ work queued up in the in-box of a particular actor. The 11 days 
shown in the table (for the Staff actor) indicates that the change-process staff fall 11 
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 days behind at the highest point (during the Engineering activities). Backlog can be 
an excellent predictor of project exceptions and risk, as it highlights bottlenecks in 
the process. 
Although such performance measures have some merit on their own (they 
reveal a diversity of performance aspects associated with the modeled change 
process), their principal value derives from comparison between alternate change 
processes. For instance, when we develop a model of the change process 
associated with large group intervention (e.g., Appreciative Inquiry Summit), we will 
be able to compare its relative performance with that of the command-first model 
across this array of dependent variables. This remains for future research as well. 
Insightful Manipulations 
The VDT modeling tool set implemented via SimVision includes nearly a 
hundred different parameters—each driven by Organization Theory and validated 
empirically—which can be varied to specify different organizations and 
environments. We discuss two here that offer insight into how changes in 
organizational climate and environment can affect performance of the change 
process: 1) noise and 2) experience. 
First, the Noise parameter captures effects of the organizational environment 
that are associated with interruptions. Such effects can include unsolicited telephone 
calls, informational requests from co-workers, non-job-related conversations, 
requirements to attend meetings outside the task focus of actors, demands to 
perform activities that draw actors away from their primary project tasks, travel 
periods and like factors, in addition to organizational difficulties in terms of 
communications (e.g., unclear, equivocal, or conflicting directions). A change 
organization that is relatively “quiet” would have a lower noise parameter setting 
than one that is relatively “loud,” for instance. The setting for our command-first 
organization described above is 0.2, which represents the kind of relatively hectic 
and equivocal organizational environment associated generally with an acquisition 
organization, but it may be entirely too low for the kind of change organization 
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 modeled here, particularly if the organization does not undergo transformational 
change frequently. Hence, we specify a higher noise level of 0.4 to provide insight 
into the effect of noise. Table 3 includes a third column to summarize the noise 
effect and provides the values from Table 2 above for direct comparison. All other 
aspects of the model delineated in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 2 above 
remain unchanged. 
Table 3. Noise & Knowledge Effects 
Measure Command Noise Experience 
Duration 350 days 354 days 303 days 
Cost $245K $250K $208K 
Work Volume 1105 P-days 1105 P-days 1105 P-days 
Rework 298 P-days 360 P-days 317 P-days 
Coordination 275 P-days 282 P-days 249 P-days 
Wait 16 P-days 20 P-days 19 P-days 
Project Risk .343 .374 .305 
Backlog 11 days (Staff) 11 days (Staff) 11 days (Staff) 
 
Notice that most of the performance measures do not change appreciably 
between our baseline, command-first values summarized in Column 2 and those 
corresponding to the higher noise environment summarized in Column 3. Indeed, 
the increased noise level has negligible impact on Duration (4 additional days), Cost 
($5K), Work Volume (no impact), Coordination (7 P-days), Wait time (4 P-days) and 
Backlog (no impact). Alternatively, the impacts on Rework (21%) and Risk (9%) are 
sizeable. This provides insight into how top management can influence the work 
environment in a negative manner simply by allowing interruptions to grow. It 
provides insight also into the kinds of performance measures (e.g., rework and risk) 
that are relatively sensitive to noise. 
Table 3 includes a fourth column also to summarize the experience effect. As 
above, all other aspects of the model delineated in Figure 1 and summarized in 
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 Table 2 above remain unchanged. The Application Experience parameter represents 
the level of experience that certain organizational actors have in a particular 
application domain. In this case, we modify the experience levels of the Top 
Management team only, increasing its Application Experience level one step, from 
Low to Medium. This represents the level of experience the top-management team 
has with organizational change, with Low reflecting minimal experience, and Medium 
reflecting some prior experience. This represents a top-management team that has 
been involved with previous change processes, in addition to possessing acquisition 
experience. In contrast to these top-management settings, the Experts & 
Consultants actors have Application Experience set to the level High across all 
models; this is why they are called “experts” and are hired as consultants. 
As above, it is worth noting that most of the performance measures do not 
change appreciably between our baseline, command-first values summarized in 
Column 2 and those corresponding to the higher-experience actors summarized in 
Column 4. Alternatively, both the Duration (303 days) and Cost ($208K) measures 
are down appreciably, as are Coordination (249 P-days) and Risk (0.305). Notice 
also that the performance areas of change associated with increased experience 
(e.g., Duration, Cost, Coordination) differ from those affected by increased noise 
(e.g., Rework), and that experience has an effect on Risk that is opposite to that of 
noise (i.e., decrease to 0.305 vs. increase to 0.374). Intuitively, more knowledgeable 
top managers have a positive effect on the change process, and a noisier 
environment has a negative effect. Beyond mere intuition, however, using 
computational models such as this enables us to quantify the effects of such 
intuition. This can be very powerful. 
Linkages to Findings 
The computational model described above captures several elements from 
our findings in this study, and represents them in a semi-formal manner—one which 
makes explicit the various assumptions pertaining to the change process (e.g., 
number of participants, skill levels, noise and experience), and which can reproduce 
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 results reliably from one simulation to the next, regardless of who runs the model. 
This provides an unprecedented level of precision in terms of describing and 
communicating about change processes, and it enables us to both quantify and 
compare the relative performance of alternate approaches to change—before 
committing to one approach versus another. This offers the potential to revolutionize 
change management in the acquisition domain. 
This computational model also draws directly from the qualitative study 
above, instantiating the top-down, relatively noisy, hierarchical environment 
described by the acquisition professionals interviewed. This provides a degree of 
representational validity to the model, and it provides the ability to represent 
computationally the kinds of factors described by acquisition professionals. The 
computational model draws directly from the theoretical study above also, 
instantiating the command-first, sequential, small-group intervention process 
ascribed to most DoD change processes. As above, this provides a degree of 
theoretical grounding to the model, and it provides the ability to represent 
computationally the kinds of factors described by theory.  
However, some important, empirical factors (such as risk aversion, change for 
change’s sake, and optimism) are not represented well by this model. Likewise, 
some important theoretical factors (such as sense-making, identify formation and 
resistance to change) are not represented well by this model, either. Hence, we 
must be selective about which factors and effects to assess via computational 
models, and which will require alternate means of evaluation. We must also 
endeavor to continue this exploratory research, perhaps enriching the ontology of 
the VDT tool set to represent such important empirical and theoretical factors. This 
provides a segue to our agenda for future research. 
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 Conclusion  
The DoD is a large, bureaucratic, rule-intensive organization that may no 
longer be best suited for its new environment. Building upon prior research on 
acquisition centralization, knowledge dynamics and organizational design, we draw 
upon the best knowledge and practice in change management (e.g., including 
Models of Planned Change, Change Typologies and Planning the Flow of 
intervention types, Intervention Models within DoD, Sense-making as a tool to 
understand change processes, and the Logic for beginning with socializing 
interventions and Large Scale Change), and analyze transformation from the classic 
Hierarchy to radical, alternate organizational forms such as the Edge-like Holonistic 
organization identified through prior research as offering excellent potential to 
improve the performance of Defense acquisition organizations.  
Such analysis focuses on the processes of change from one organizational 
form to another, and leads to the generation of transformational plans—involving 
both radical and incremental means—which can be used by acquisition leaders, 
practitioners and policy makers to outline steps—and leaps—required to affect 
fundamental organizational change. In particular, we argue how the traditional DoD, 
command-first, approach to change suffers from great limitations when large-scale 
transformation is desired, and that such large-scale transformations are required to 
move from the current Hierarchy to Edge-like Holonistic organizations.  
Alternatively, to overcome the stubborn nature of the DoD Bureaucracy and to 
affect the strong, persistent collective identity of acquisition professionals, different, 
socialization-first, large group interventions such as the Appreciative Inquiry Summit 
are called for. This represents a key result for the acquisition leader and policy 
maker: The process of organizational change cannot be managed in the same way 
that the process of acquisition management is. Change is different from acquisition. 
It should be no surprise that the management of change should differ from the 
management of acquisition. 
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 We also build upon prior work on computational modeling and 
experimentation to develop models of the transformation process, and we explore 
such models to emulate the behavior of the alternate transformational plans noted 
above. By modeling and experimenting with processes of change, as opposed to 
processes of ongoing organizational routines, we begin to extend the state-of-the-art 
in computational modeling and experimentation. Although our exploratory modeling 
work represents only a relatively small step in this direction, we illustrate how even 
elusive change processes can be modeled with both representational validity and 
theoretical grounding, and we provide insight into the kinds of controllable factors 
that influence the performance of change processes: environmental noise impedes 
change, and application experience of top managers promotes change. Although 
such insight is consistent with intuition, we possess now the ability to quantify such 
intuition, and to compare the relative performance of myriad, diverse, alternate 
approaches to organizational change. This opens up a whole new way to plan and 
execute organizational change in acquisition. 
Clearly, additional research along the lines of this investigation is called for. 
Additional qualitative work can uncover even deeper insights into the indicators and 
nature of change in acquisition, for example, and additional theoretical work can 
identify even more generalizable guidelines for approaching planned change. 
Theoretical work can also serve to guide additional qualitative studies, and 
qualitative work can, likewise, inform additional theoretical studies. Both qualitative 
and theoretical work can guide and inform additional computational modeling, and 
computational modeling work can both guide and inform additional qualitative and 
theoretical research. This integrated, three-part research approach of ours—one 
which places theoretical study at the fulcrum to balance qualitative fieldwork with 
computational experimentation—offers huge advantage in terms of triangulation, and 
we show already how results can inform the acquisition leader and policy maker 
today, as well as guide the acquisition researcher tomorrow. 
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